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1. Introduction
Peer	review	is	the	main	way	in	which	philosophy	journals	determine	
what	 enters	 into	 the	 (official)	 record	 of	 philosophy.	 We	 examine	
the	 role	 peer	 review	 had	 in	 two	 important	 episodes	 in	 the	 history	
of	 twentieth-century	 philosophy,	 episodes	 that	 centre	 on	 changing	
editorial	 policies	 at	 the	 journal	Mind under	 the	 editorships	 of	 G.	E.	
Moore	and	G.	Ryle.	We	show	that	bias	about	philosophical	approach	
radically	affected	Mind’s	contents.	We	thus	illustrate	the	impact	such	
bias	can	have	on	academic	philosophy.	We	also	take	a	look	at	the	role	
peer	review	has	in	(recent)	mainstream	philosophy,	which	we	identify	
with	the	kind	of	philosophy	that	has	dominated	prominent	philosophy	
journals	in	the	English-speaking	world	over	recent	decades	—	journals	
such	 as	 Mind, The Philosophical Review, Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and	Philosophy of Science.	We	
point	out	 that	peer	 review	 (in	 journals)	has	been,	 and	continues	 to	
be,	 partisan	 about	 philosophical	 approach	 in	much	 the	 way	 it	 was	
in	Mind under	Moore	and	Ryle.	We	also	note	that	such	partisanship	
should	not,	on	the	official	view	of	the	role	of	peer	review,	be	part	of	
peer	 review.	We	go	on	 to	 consider	whether	we	ought	 to	accept	 the	
verdict	that	peer	review	in	mainstream	philosophy	is	problematic.	Two	
features	 of	 mainstream	 philosophy	 are	 important	 here,	 namely	 the	
absence	of	established-to-be-reliable	ways	of	answering	philosophers’	
substantive	 questions	 and	 professional	 philosophers’	 dependence	
on	funds	provided	by	others.	 In	view	of	these	features,	current	peer	
review	practices	turn	out	to	be	epistemically	and	morally	problematic.
Finally,	we	examine	what,	 if	anything,	should	be	done	about	 the	
epistemic	and	moral	problems	we	have	identified.	We	outline	two	de-
siderata	that	need	to	be	fulfilled	in	order	to	alleviate	these	problems,	
including	fostering	pluralism	regarding	philosophical	approaches	and	
evaluating	philosophical	work	according	to	its	contribution	to	devel-
oping	thought	in	ways	that	are	of	value.	We	argue	that	these	desiderata	
can	be	better	fulfilled	with	relative	ease	and,	therefore,	should	be	bet-
ter	fulfilled.	We	outline	several	proposals	that	are	relatively	easy	to	im-
plement,	including	diversifying	journals’	editorial	boards	and	review	
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F.	H.	Bradley,	is	British	absolute	idealism.	Absolute	idealism	has	at	its	
heart	the	idea	that	reality	is	ultimately	one	mind-like,	concrete	whole.	
British	pluralistic	idealism	is	another	prominent	school	within	British	
idealism,	one	that	takes	ultimate	reality	to	be	a	community	of	minds	
and	that	arises	largely	as	a	response	to	absolute	idealism.2	Opposed	to	
British	idealism	during	the	period	at	hand	are	a	number	of	approaches	
that	 are	 predominantly	 critical.	 These	 include	 classical	 analytic	 phi-
losophy,	which	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 logical	 and	 linguistic	
analysis	and	grew	out	of	the	work	of	Moore	and	B.	Russell,	as	well	as	
realist	approaches	that	take	the	analysis	of	perception	as	their	starting	
point;	the	latter	approaches	include	new	realism,	which	was	a	form	of	
direct	realism,	and	critical	realism,	which	borrowed	from	both	direct	
and	 representational	 realism.3	Another	approach	 to	philosophy	 that	
is	important	in	Britain	during	our	period	is	philosophical	psychology.	
This	 approach	 can,	 in	 principle,	 be	 combined	 either	with	 critical	 or	
with	 speculative	 approaches	 to	 philosophy	 and	 centres	 on	 the	 idea	
that	psychological	analysis	can	solve,	or	help	to	solve,	many,	or	all,	of	
the	problems	of	philosophy.4
The	first	 of	 our	 two	historical	 case	 studies	 concerns	 the	 policies	
of	Moore	in	his	role	as	editor	of	Mind	from	1921,	when	he	took	over	
the	role	from	G.	Stout,	until	1948,	when	Ryle	took	over	the	editorship.	
We	will	see	that	Moore’s	partisan	editorship	of	Mind	 results,	already	
in	the	1920s,	in	the	marginalisation	of	philosophical	psychology	and	
of	British	 idealism.	Going	 through	 the	 volumes	of	Mind shows that, 
during	the	first	four	years	of	Moore’s	editorship,	Mind	was	pluralistic	
in	a	way	that	was	similar	to	its	pluralism	under	Stout,	whose	policy	of	
impartiality	between	different	schools	of	philosophy	Moore	claimed	
(Schilpp	1942)	to	continue.	Absolute	idealism,	pluralistic	forms	of	ide-
alism,	 philosophical	 psychology,	 new	 and	 critical	 realism,	 classical	
analytic	philosophy	and	the	history	of	philosophy	are	all	prominent	in	
2.	 For	more	on	British	 idealism,	see	Mander	(2011)	and	Boucher	and	Vincent	
(2012).
3.	 For	more	on	these	forms	of	realism,	see	Marion	(2000a	and	2000b).
4.	 For	more	on	philosophical	psychology,	see	van	der	Schaar	(1995).
committees	as	well	as	making	peer	review	much	more	public	and	far	
less	selective	than	it	currently	is.1	In	effect,	we	suggest	minimising,	as	
far	as	feasible,	the	role	of	peer	review	in	determining	what	enters	into	
the	debate.
We	look	at	the	history,	and	current	practice,	of	peer	review	in	phi-
losophy	 in	 section	 2.	We	 consider	 the	 partisanship	 involved	 in	 sec-
tion	3.	Section	4	argues	that	this	partisanship	is	problematic.	Section	5	
examines	what,	if	anything,	should	be	done	to	change	peer	review	in	
philosophy.
2. Two Episodes in the History of Peer Review in Philosophy and Their 
Legacy
Some	background	to	our	philosophical	case	studies	can	be	provided	
by	a	variant	of	a	distinction	 that	was	used	 in	Britain	and	elsewhere	
during	the	first	half	of	 the	twentieth	century,	namely	the	distinction	
between	speculative	and	critical	approaches	to	philosophy	(see,	e.g.,	
Broad	 1924;	 Mackenzie	 1930;	 Stedman	 1937).	 Roughly,	 speculative	
philosophy	 has	 as	 a	 central	 aim	 the	 making	 of	 substantive	 claims	
about	reality	as	a	whole,	as	well	as	the	aim	of	doing	so	in	a	way	that	is	
epistemically	independent	of	science,	ordinary	language	and	common	
sense.	Critical	philosophy,	by	contrast,	tends	to	avoid	making	claims	
to	knowledge	that	are	independent	in	this	way;	in	some	(particularly	
critical)	variants,	critical	philosophy	aims	to	avoid	making	any	claims	
to	 new	 knowledge	 at	 all	 and,	 instead,	merely	 aims	 to	 illuminate	 or	
clarify	what	is	already	known.
One	of	 the	main	approaches	 to	philosophy	 in	Britain	during	 the	
first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	is	British	idealism.	It	is,	as	Mander	
(2011,	 pp.	 88–89)	 observes,	 predominantly	 speculative	 and,	 further,	
holds	that	reality	is	ultimately	mind-like.	One	important	school	with-
in	British	idealism,	a	school	that	is	most	prominently	represented	by	
1.	 Based	on	the	APA/BPA	survey	mentioned	earlier,	we	calculated	that	for	the	
responding	journals,	the	average	rejection	rate	in	2013	was	88.3%	(SD	=	6),	
with	a	maximum	of	98%	(The Philosophical Review)	and	a	minimum	of	71%	
(The	American	Journal	of	Bioethics).
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particular,	Philosophy	—	which,	 interestingly	enough,	was	 founded	 in	
1926	—	and	the	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society continued	regularly	
to	publish	work	supporting	British	idealism.8	When	The Philosophical 
Quarterly	was	founded	in	1950	with	the	British	idealist	T.	M.	Knox	as	its	
editor,	it	also	provided	a	regular	venue	for	speculative	thought,	includ-
ing	idealism.9	At	least	some	British	idealists	published	work	in	Ameri-
can	 journals	 such	as	The Journal of Philosophy, The Personalist	 (which	
became	the	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly	in	1980)	and	The Philosophical 
Review.10	Thus,	while	Mind	was	supposed	—	as	Sorley	attests	in	his	1926	
Mind	article	celebrating	fifty	years	of	Mind	—	to	be	a	journal	that	served	
all	philosophical	approaches	in	Britain,	it	no	longer	did.	That	the	shift	
in	 journal	contents	can	be	attributed	to	editorial	policy	 is	suggested	
by	the	suddenness	of	the	shift.	Moreover,	since	Lewy’s	(1976)	contri-
bution	to	the	special	edition	of	Mind	put	together	for	 its	100th	anni-
versary	makes	clear	that	Moore	was	essentially	solely	responsible	for	
reviewing	submissions	to	Mind	and	deciding	on	whether	they	should	
be	published,	it	seems	Moore	was	responsible	for	the	change	in	policy	
and	 its	 implementation.	Moore	thus	 failed	to	continue	the	 impartial	
policy	of	Stout.11
Our	 description	 of	what	Moore	 included	 in	Mind	 fits	with	what	
Lewy	 (1976)	 tells	 us	 about	 this;	 Lewy’s	 description	 is	merely	 under-
stated,	and	substantially	incomplete,	regarding	the	mid-1920s	chang-
es	 in	 the	 journal.	Our	description	does,	however,	 conflict	with	War-
nock’s	(1976)	contribution	to	the	100th-anniversary	special	edition	of	
8.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Mackenzie	 (1930),	 Fawcett	 (1932),	 Jeans	 (1932),	 Kamiat	 (1938),	
Oakeley	(1945)	and	Mure	(1949)	in	Philosophy;	see	also	Hallett	(1931),	Bow-
man	(1932),	Paton	(1935)	and	Stedman	(1937)	in	the	Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society.
9.	 See	Knox’s	paper	 “Thought	and	 Its	Objects”	 (1969)	 for	a	 taste	of	his	views.	
Examples	of	idealist	and	speculative	papers	in	The Philosophical Quarterly	in	
the	1950s	include	Harris	(1953	&	1956),	Leclerc	(1953)	and	Hartshorne	(1958).
10.	 The	pluralist	idealist	H.	W.	Carr,	for	example,	publishes	articles	in	all	of	these	
journals	(See	his	1926,	1929	and	1949);	he	dies	in	1931,	after	having	moved	to	
America	from	Britain	in	1925.
11.	 Lewy	was	sub-editor	of	Mind	in	the	early	1940s,	when	Moore	was	in	the	Unit-
ed	States	of	America.
the	journal.	More	idiosyncratic	approaches	to	philosophy	and	pragma-
tism	are	also	present,	though	pragmatism	is	found	only	in	the	work	of	
F.	C.	S.	Schiller.	Here,	we	do	find	substantial	representation	of	the	radi-
cally	different	approaches	to	philosophy	found	in	Britain	at	the	time.	
In	1925,	there	is	a	flourish	of	work	on	Bradley’s	absolute	idealism	and	
J.	Ward’s	pluralistic	idealism;	this	flourish	is	attributable	to	the	death	
of	Bradley	in	1924	and	the	death	of	Ward	in	1925.	After	this,	however,	
Mind	 changes.	Work	 associated	with	new	and	 critical	 realism,	work	
in	the	history	of	philosophy	and,	especially,	work	in	classical	analytic	
philosophy	are	prominent	in	the	journal;	pragmatism	continues	to	be	
represented,	 largely	by	Schiller’s	work.	However,	 from	 1926	until	 at	
least	1940,	Mind	includes	no	full-length	papers	that	favour	pluralistic	
idealism	and	only	three	that	favour	absolute	idealism.5	These	three	pa-
pers	aside,	absolute	and	pluralistic	idealists	publish	full-length	papers	
in	Mind	 only	when	 the	 papers	 are	 compatible	with	 realist	 and	 ana-
lytic	approaches,	e.g.,	when	the	papers	are	purely	historical.6	Two	full-
length	philosophical	psychology	papers	appear	in	the	journal	in	1926,	
but	we	count	only	six	more	prior	to	1940,	four	of	which	appear	in	1931;	
by	contrast,	for	example,	there	are	at	least	twelve	full-length	papers	in	
philosophical	psychology	in	the	journal	during	the	years	1920–1923.7
In	sum,	around	1924–1925,	editorial	policy	at	Mind appears to have 
changed	so	as	 to	 favour	some	of	 the	approaches	 to	philosophy	 that	
were	 still	 thriving	 in	 Britain	 over	 others	 that	were	 doing	 so.	 For	 in-
stance,	 it	 is	well	 documented	 that	 British	 idealism	 continued	 to	 be	
productive	until	at	least	the	1950s	(Broadie	2009;	Akehurst	2011;	Man-
der	2011).	Moreover,	while	Moore’s	policy	is	plausibly	thought	to	have	
pushed	some	British	idealist	work	into	books	or,	as	our	discussion	of	
R.	G.	Collingwood	below	will	suggest,	out	of	print	altogether,	British	
journals	did	continue	to	publish	work	that	supports	British	idealism.	In	
5.	 The	three	papers	are	Hoernlé	(1927),	Mackenzie	(1927)	and	Foster	(1931).
6.	 See,	e.g.,	Loewenberg	(1934)	and	Hoernlé	(1936).
7.	 The	post-1925	philosophical	psychology	papers	are	Rignano	(1926),	Strong	
(1926	&	1928),	Mace	(1931),	Piaget	(1931),	Ritchie	(1931),	Morgan	(1931)	and	
Duncker	(1939).
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answered	criticism	of	British	idealist	positions	—	sometimes	by	British	
idealists	—	continues	throughout	the	decade.15	In	sum,	a	decisive	battle	
between	approaches	 to	philosophy	never	occurred	 in	Mind.	 Instead,	
Moore’s	partisanship	about	approaches	to	philosophy	gave	rise	to	an	
orthodoxy	in	the	journal	already	in	the	second	half	of	the	1920s.	
Our	second	historical	case	study	concerns	Ryle’s	editorship	of	Mind, 
which	continued	from	the	end	of	Moore’s	editorship	until	1972.	Ryle,	
like	Moore,	was	essentially	 solely	 responsible	 for	 reviewing	 submis-
sions	 to	Mind	 and	deciding	on	 their	 fate	 (see	Warnock	 1976).	More-
over,	his	decisions	on	this	matter	reflected	at	least	three	relevant	poli-
cies	 regarding	Mind’s	 contents.	 First,	 Ryle	 substantially	 reduced	 the	
presence	of	 the	history	of	philosophy	 in	Mind	 (Hamlyn	2003),	 thus	
reversing	Moore’s	 policy	 on	 the	matter.	 Second,	 Ryle	 believed	 that	
philosophical	 problems	 could	 be	 addressed	 briefly	 (Hamlyn	 2003).	
It	is	thus	no	surprise	that,	as	Findlay	(1976)	points	out,	Ryle	reduced	
the	length	of	articles	in	Mind	drastically.	Moore,	and	Stout	before	him,	
regularly	published	articles	in	two	to	three	instalments,	each	of	which	
could	be	over	 twenty	pages	 in	 length.	Ryle	 almost	never	published	
articles	much	longer	than	twenty	pages	in	length.	Findlay	judges	that	
the	short-article	policy	favoured	a	piecemeal	approach	to	philosophy.	
According	to	Findlay,	it	changed	“Mind	from	being	a	catholic	journal	
into	 being	 the	 organ	 of	 a	 school,	 and	 drove	 those	who	 did	 not	 be-
long	to	a	school	 into	either	 founding	new	journals	or	writing	major	
books”	 (Findlay	 1976,	p.	 60).	Given	what	we	have	 seen,	 Findlay,	no	
less	than	Warnock,	is	wrong	about	when	Mind	ceased	to	be	a	“catholic”	
journal.	But	it	is	plausible	that	the	emphasis	on	short	articles	in	Mind 
encouraged	the	more	piecemeal	approach	to	philosophy	that	was	on	
display	in	its	pages	during	Ryle’s	tenure.	As	a	corollary,	though	more	
tentatively,	it	seems	plausible	that	the	short-article	policy	encouraged,	
by	 encouraging	 articles	 composed	 of	 responses	 to	 other	 articles,	 a	
particularly	combative	form	of	philosophy,	one	in	which	adversarial	
15.	 See,	e.g.,	Stedman	(1934)	and	Acton	(1936).
Mind.	Warnock	claims	that	it	was	during	the	Second	World	War	that	
an	orthodoxy	emerged	in	Britain	and	in	Mind,	one	which	comprised	
an	agreement	that	British	idealism	was	not	to	be	taken	seriously	and	
another	 agreement	 to	 take	 empiricism,	 positivism,	 analysis	 and	 the	
trio	Russell,	Moore	and	L.	Wittgenstein	seriously	(Warnock	1976,	pp.	
48–49).	Further,	Warnock	claims	that	this	orthodoxy	emerged	after	a	
battle	in	the	1930s	among	radically	different	species	of	philosophy.	In	
support	of	this,	he	mentions	an	early-1930s	exchange	in	Mind	between	
H.	W.	B.	Joseph	and	L.	S.	Stebbing,	and	Ryle’s	1935	criticism	of	Collin-
gwood’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 ontological	 argument.12	According	 to	War-
nock’s	reconstruction,	then,	the	changes	in	Mind	were	not	the	result	
of	Moore’s	policy,	as	they	took	place	only	at	the	very	end	of	Moore’s	
editorship	and	were	the	result	of	a	debate	which	was	decided	in	favour	
of	the	new	orthodoxy.	
Yet,	Joseph’s	discussion	of	Stebbing’s	work	is	a	criticism	of	the	Rus-
sellian	application	of	the	new	logic	in	analysing	natural	language;	this	
target	not	only	reflects	a	rather	limited	disagreement	when	compared	
with	the	broad	range	of	disagreements	found	in	Mind	before	1926,	but	
is	consistent	with	the	orthodoxy	described	by	Warnock	and	is	in	the	
spirit	of	the	(partly	Moore-inspired!)	ordinary-language	philosophy	of	
the	1930s.13	With	respect	to	philosophy	that	is	not	part	of	Warnock’s	
orthodoxy,	Warnock	mistakes	its	presence	as	an	object	of	criticism	or	
historical	 interest	 in	Mind	 of	 the	 1930s	 for	 something	 else.	 Colling-
wood	 responds	 to	 Ryle	 in	 private	 correspondence	 and	writes	 there	
that	no	editor	would	consider	publishing	the	response	(Vrijen	2006).	
The	response	to	Ryle	in	Mind	comprises	only	a	short	discussion	note	
by	E.	E.	Harris	(1936),	albeit	one	that	defends	Hegel’s	treatment	of	the	
ontological	argument.	J.	M.	E.	McTaggart’s	idealist	views	are	discussed	
extensively	in	Mind	in	1930,	but	in	a	purely	critical	way.14	Indeed,	un-
12.	 See	Ryle	 (1935)	and,	 for	 the	 start	of	 the	 Joseph-Stebbing	exchange,	 Joseph	
(1932)	and	Stebbing	(1933).
13.	 See,	 e.g.,	 J.	 Wisdom’s	 (1938)	 ordinary-language	 treatment	 of	 Joseph’s	
arguments.
14.	 See	Gotshalk	(1930)	and	Oakeley	(1930).
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inference	and	clarity	in	mainstream	philosophy	m-rigour	and	m-clarity 
respectively.17	 M-rigour	 predominantly	 characterises	 argumentation	
that	aims	to	uncover	the	correct	answers	to	substantive	philosophical	
questions	(Brennan	2010;	Chalmers	2015).	In	addition,	as	argued	by	
Hundleby	(forthcoming)	and	observed	by	Moulton	(1983)	and	Fried-
man	(2013),	m-rigour	predominantly	characterises	argumentation	that	
is	adversarial.	To	this	we	add	that	m-rigour	predominantly	includes	a	
certain	perspective	on	what	counts	as	a	reasonable	or	plausible	start-
ing	point	 for	argumentation.	What	counts	will	 change	somewhat	 in	
response	 to	 discussion	 in	mainstream	 philosophy	 and	with	 its	 sub-
fields,	but	will	 largely	be	 constrained	at	 any	given	 time/subfield	by	
which	authors	and	discussions	are	to	be	cited	and	by	a	conservative	
bias	with	 respect	 to	 these;	 the	 default	 assumption	 is	 that	 good	 rea-
sons	need	to	be	found	for	rejecting	these	authors’	positions.	No	doubt,	
there	is	more	to	m-rigour	than	just	suggested.
The	standards	of	m-clarity	can	plausibly	be	partially	characterised	
in	 terms	of	 the	 requirement	 that	 an	 author’s	work	be	 relatively	 eas-
ily	understood	by	other	mainstream	philosophers,	especially	by	those	
having	 the	work	as	 their	 area	of	 specialisation.	The	 standards	of	m-
clarity	 also	 plausibly	 involve	 the	 requirement	 that	 concepts,	 propo-
sitions,	 inferences	 and	 larger-than-inference-level	 argumentative	
structures	that	make	up	written	philosophical	work	be	presented	us-
ing	one	of	a	limited	repertoire	of	standardised	language	forms;	at	the	
most	general	level,	these	forms	will	borrow	from	symbolic	logic	and/
or	 regimented,	 informal	 reasoning,	 but	 they	 will	 also	 borrow	 from	
more	domain-specific	forms	such	as	the	terminology	of	recent	analytic	
metaphysics	or	recent	meta-ethics.	Worked-out	definitions	of	m-clar-
ity	are	hard	to	find,	and	it	would	be	premature	to	settle	on	any	single	
substantive	definition.
17.	 We	use	the	terms	‘m-rigour’	and	‘m-clarity’	rather	than	‘rigour’	and	‘clarity’	in	
order	to	remain	neutral	about	what	rigour	and	clarity	are.	In	this	context,	note	
that	we	do	not	object	to	using	the	perhaps	natural	‘(recent)	analytic	philoso-
phy’	instead	of	‘mainstream	philosophy’,	though	we	caution	that	how	recent	
mainstream	philosophy	relates	to	the	analytic	tradition	discussed	earlier	in	
this	section	may	not	be	straightforward.
argumentation	plays	a	growing	 role.16	Further	encouragement	along	
these	 lines	was	provided	by	 the	proliferation	of	discussion	notes	 in	
Mind	—	papers	with	short	comments	on,	or	a	few	counter-arguments	
to,	positions	developed	in	the	more	substantive	articles	published	in	
the	journal	(Hamlyn	2003).
The	 third	 relevant	 policy	 concerns	 British	 idealism.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	as	we	have	already	noted,	it	still	attracted	many	supporters	in	
Britain	during	the	1950s.	On	the	other	hand,	the	pages	of	Mind	during	
this	decade	reflected	an	orthodoxy	as	to	who	is	worthy	of	discussion,	
as	we	have	seen	Warnock	(1976)	notes.	Mind	largely	limits	its	contents	
to	approaches	that	came	to	be	part	of	mid-century	analytic	philosophy,	
namely	approaches	 inspired	by	classical	analytic	philosophy	and	by	
logical	positivism.
In	summary,	philosophy	in	Mind	during	Ryle’s	period	comes	closer	
to	 resembling	 the	 standard	 picture	 of	 analytic	 philosophy	 than	 did	
philosophy	 in	Mind	 during	Moore’s	 period.	Under	Ryle,	 philosophy	
in	Mind	does	tend	to	be	a-historical	and	piecemeal,	and	it	frequently	
involves	approaches	that	can	be	traced	back	to	Moore,	Russell,	Witt-
genstein	and	logical	positivism.	Adversarial	argumentation	also	seems	
to	receive	encouragement.	To	a	substantial	extent,	these	changes	can	
be	attributed	to	Ryle’s	decisions	about	what	was	appropriate	content	
for Mind.
We	can	here	only	touch	on	the	legacy	of	the	above	episodes	of	par-
tisanship	 in	 peer	 review.	We	do	 so	 by	noting	 one	 important	 aspect	
of	journal	peer	review	that	has	arguably	survived	and	spread	during	
the	substantial	 changes	 in	philosophy	since	Ryle’s	editorship,	name-
ly	the	commitment	to	a	certain	argumentative,	adversarial	approach	
to	philosophy	 and	 an	 associated	 approach	 to	 clarity.	 Let	 us	 call	 the	
admittedly	 somewhat	 heterogeneous,	 but	 nevertheless	 related	 by	
strong	resemblance,	standards	applied	over	recent	decades	in	judging	
16.	 Philosophical	dialogue	 in	 the	adversarial	mode	“consists	of	objections	and	
counterexamples	to	which	the	best	responses	are	refutations	of	objections	and	
counterexamples	followed	by more of the same”	(Friedman	2013,	p.	28,	italics	in	
the	original).
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Finally,	reviewers	are	presumably	as	subject	to	partisanship	as	editors.	
If	they	are	selected	in	virtue	of	sharing	similar	philosophical	commit-
ments,	their	judgments	can	be	expected	to	align	with	those	the	editor	
who	selected	them	would	make.
3.  The Official Function of Peer Review and Its Role in Philosophy
Let	us	turn	to	describing	the	official	view	of	the	role	of	peer	review	and	
to	considering	what	this	view	implies	about	the	policies	of	Moore	and	
Ryle,	and	about	more	recent	peer	 review	 in	mainstream	philosophy	
journals.	 The	 official	 function	 of	 peer	 review	 is	 certification:	 peer	
review	certifies	the	quality	of	research	output	(an	epistemic	role)	and	
of	the	scholars	producing	such	output	(a	non-epistemic	role)	(Shatz	
2004).	 Ideally,	 it	 is	merely	 in	 virtue	 of	 this	 certifying	 role	 that	 peer	
review	regulates	the	research	agenda	of	a	field.
The	 epistemic	 role	 of	 peer	 review	 is	 assessing	 the	 quality	 of	 re-
search.	 From	 the	 hundreds	 of	 thousands,	 or	 even	millions,	 of	man-
uscripts	 submitted	on	a	yearly	basis,18	 it	weeds	out	 those	which	are	
not	sound,	significant	or	novel.	Peer	review	is	thought	to	be	a	particu-
larly	powerful	 procedure	because	 it	 is	 carried	out	by	people	whose	
opinion	on	 the	 subject	 is	 authoritative;	who,	as	 scientists,	 are	more	
likely	to	judge	work	on	scientific	merit	than	in	terms	of	more	ordinary	
concerns	 (e.g.,	market	 considerations,	 politics);	 and	who	 can	 be	 as-
sumed	 to	 be	 impartial,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 not	 being	 too	 closely	 linked	
to	the	author(s)	whose	work	is	being	reviewed	(Lee	et al.	2013).	The	
authoritative	nature	of	peer	review	is	widely	supposed	partly	to	rest	
on	the	fact	that	work	is	to	be	judged	on	shared	standards	of	excellence	
and	expediency	(Lee	et	al.	2013).	In	this	way,	peer	review	is	supposed	
to	reflect	existing	knowledge	rather	than	the	perspective	of	this	or	that	
reviewer	or	group	of	reviewers.
As	 regards	 non-epistemic	 certification,	 peer	 review	 serves	 as	 an	
evaluative	standard	in	hiring,	conferring	tenure,	promotion	and	grant	
18.	 Björk	 et  al.	 (2009;	 cited	 in	 Lee	 et  al.	 2013)	 estimate	 that	 1,346,000	 peer-
reviewed	papers	were	published	in	2006.	An	average	rejection	rate	of	50%	
would	thus	already	imply	more	than	2,000,000	submissions	for	that	year.
The	 full	 details	 of	 what	 m-rigour	 and	 m-clarity	 involve	 are	 not,	
however,	 of	 importance	 to	our	 arguments.	What	matters	 is	 that	 the	
mainstream	philosophy	 journals	we	 are	 concerned	with	 are,	 in	 em-
ploying	m-rigour	and	m-clarity	as	 criteria	 for	assessing	submissions,	
partisan	with	regard	to	which	approach	to	philosophy	they	serve	and	
thus	which	papers	they	are	willing	to	publish.	Who	suffers	from	this	
partisanship	is	something	we	discuss	in	the	next	section.
We	need	to	make	three	final	remarks.	First,	we	do	not	mean	to	im-
ply	that	Moore	and	Ryle	were	the	sole	or	even	the	primary	individu-
als	responsible	for	how	philosophy	developed	during	their	periods	of	
editorship.	Yet,	it	seems	reasonable	to	assert	that	their	policies	were	
one	salient	contributing	factor,	given	the	prominence	of	Mind	 in	the	
profession	and	given	the	role	that	publishing	in	Mind	had	on	certifying	
practitioners	in	philosophy.
Second,	the	extent	of	systematic	bias	in	peer	review	in	philosophy	
remains	to	be	explored,	but	certainly	extends	beyond	the	examples	we	
have	documented	here.	Thus,	for	example,	Howard	(2003)	has	docu-
mented	R.	Rudner’s	exclusion	of	work	on	values,	politics	or	societal	
concerns	from	Philosophy of Science	after	1958.	Haslanger	(2008)	points	
to	the	near	absence	of	feminist	thought	from	prominent	journals,	in-
cluding	Mind.	We	have	documented	 (2017)	how	a	group	of	analytic	
philosophers	by	and	large	excluded	speculative	philosophy	from	the	
pages	of	The Philosophical Review	after	they	took	over	the	journal	in	the	
late	1940s.
Third,	one	might	 think	 that	 the	 trend	 towards	out-of-house	peer	
review	has	substantially	diminished	the	discretionary	power	of	 jour-
nal	editors	and,	consequently,	that	their	partisanship	is	insufficient	to	
explain	the	present-day	convergence	of	approaches.	We	believe,	how-
ever,	that	there	is	still	ample	room	for	editors	to	exercise	their	commit-
ments.	 For	 instance,	 among	philosophy	 journals,	 desk-rejections	by	
editors	are	still	common	practice	(Lee	and	Schunn	2011).	Further,	even	
under	 triple-blind	 review,	 editors	make	 crucial	 decisions	which	 are	
open	to	partisanship,	e.g.,	on	who	will	serve	as	a	reviewer	and	on	what	
to	do	with	reviewer	reports,	be	they	positive,	negative	or	conflicting.	
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from	among	those	they	influence	within	the	community	of	actual	and	
potential	academic	philosophers.19
4. Epistemic and Moral Problems with Peer Review in Mainstream 
Philosophy
Our	 discussion	 thus	 far	 has	 aimed	 to	 be	 descriptive.	 The	 question	
remains	whether	peer	review	that	is	partisan	in	the	way	it	was	under	
Moore	and	Ryle,	 and,	with	all	 the	differences	acknowledged,	 in	 the	
way	 that	 it	 still	 is	 in	 prominent	 mainstream	 philosophy	 journals,	
should	be	avoided.	In	this	section	we	argue	that	it	should	be	avoided	
in	the	context	of	mainstream	philosophy,	at	least	if	feasible.	We	argue,	
first,	that	there	is	no	good	reason	to	prefer	the	approach	of	mainstream	
philosophy,	 including	 its	 emphasis	 on	m-clarity	 and	m-rigour,	 over	
available	alternatives	and,	second,	that	there	are	good	epistemic	and	
moral	 reasons	 for	 avoiding	partisanship	 in	 peer	 review.	 In	 the	next	
section	we	argue	that,	given	how	easy	it	is	to	improve	current	practice,	
it	should	be	improved.
A	popular	argument	 for	scepticism	about	philosophy,	namely	 the 
argument from disagreement,	can	be	used	to	support	the	claim	that	there	
is	no	good	reason	to	prefer	the	standards	of	mainstream	philosophy	
over	 available	 alternatives.	 The	 argument	 from	 disagreement	
concerns	 (at	 least)	 disagreement	 about	 the	 correctness	 of	 answers	
to	substantive	philosophical	questions,	that	is,	about	the	correctness	
of	philosophical	positions,	 including	philosophical	pictures,	theories	
and	definitions.	The	starting	point	of	the	argument	from	disagreement	
is	 the	 observation	 that	 philosophy	 is	 characterized	 by	 pervasive,	
persistent	 disagreement	 between	 epistemic	 peers	 about	 what	 the	
correct	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philosophical	 questions	 are.	 Given	
this	observation,	 the	argument	would	have	us	 infer	 that	philosophy	
cannot	settle	substantive	philosophical	questions	in	an	epistemically	
19.	 This	does	not	mean	that,	on	the	standard	perspective	of	peer	review,	journals	
specializing	in	specific	approaches	are	generally	biased	in	a	problematic	way.	
Such	specialization	might,	for	example,	have	limited	influence	on	those	not	
sharing	in	the	specialization,	or	might	even	serve	to	provide	a	temporary	cor-
rection	to	a	bias	against	an	approach.
committee	decisions.	Peer-reviewed	articles	are	taken	to	demonstrate	
a	scholar’s	ability	to	(continue	to)	contribute	to	a	field,	in	a	way	recog-
nized	by	that	field	and,	at	least	in	comparison	to	invited	contributions,	
independently	from	the	scholar’s	personal	and	professional	networks.
For	our	purposes,	what	matters	is	that,	from	the	standard	perspec-
tive	 just	described,	 the	partisan	approaches	of	Moore	and	Ryle	dur-
ing	their	editorships	of	Mind	should	be	avoided	in	peer	review.	The	
epistemic	role	of	peer	review	was	undermined	because	the	epistemic	
standards	of	evaluation	employed	during	these	editorships	were	not	
shared	among	the	scholars	served	by	the	editorships.
Things	 get	more	 complicated	when	 it	 comes	 to	more	 recent	par-
tisanship	about	approaches	 to	philosophy.	 It	 is	natural	 to	 think	 that	
the	community	currently	served	by,	say,	Mind	just	comprises	contem-
porary,	mainstream	philosophers.	This	community	does,	 it	might	be	
suggested,	share	standards	for	evaluating	philosophical	work.	Thus	it	
might	be	thought	that,	although	the	journal	has	recently	been	partisan	
about	how	philosophy	should	be	carried	out,	its	peer	review	practices	
have	been	in	accord	with	the	standard	requirements	of	peer	review.	
Such	 a	 line	 of	 thought	 is,	 however,	 too	 quick.	 Mind	 and	 other	
prominent	journals	collectively	play	an	important	role	in	determining	
how	resources	such	as	jobs,	funding	and	research	time	are	distributed	
among	academics	working,	and	seeking	to	work,	in	academic	philoso-
phy	in	the	United	States	of	America,	the	United	Kingdom	and	other	
countries.	Accordingly,	 the	community	 these	 journals	 serve	extends	
well	 beyond	 those	who	 accept	 the	 standards	 of	mainstream	 philos-
ophy;	 it	 includes,	 for	example,	many	working	 in	African	philosophy,	
feminist	 philosophers	 critical	 of	mainstream	 philosophy,	many	 con-
tinental	philosophers	and	many	of	 those	who	see	themselves	as	 try-
ing	to	bridge	the	analytic-continental	divide.	The	community	in	ques-
tion	also	includes	those	who	are	not	quite	a	good	fit	for	any	particular	
widely	 adopted	 approach	 to	 philosophy.	 The	 journals	 being	 consid-
ered	are	thus,	deliberately	or	not,	partisan	about	whom	they	support	
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including	mainstream	philosophy,	is	pervasive;	it	leaves	no	answers	to	
substantive	issues	within	philosophy	untouched.
A	more	popular	 response	 to	 the	 argument	 from	disagreement	 is	
that	 the	 appropriate	 standards	 for	 accepting	answers	 to	 substantive	
philosophical	 questions	 are	 low	 enough	 so	 as	 not	 to	 be	 rendered	
problematic	 by	 the	disagreement	we	find	 among	philosophers	 (see,	
e.g.,	 Brennan	 2010;	 Sosa	 2011;	 Goldberg	 2013;	 Siepel	 2016).	 This	
response	 acknowledges	 that	 if	 reliability	 is	 demanded	 of	 standards	
for	accepting	answers	to	substantive	philosophical	questions,	then	no	
acceptable	 standards	are	 to	be	 found.	But,	we	are	 told,	 the	 relevant	
standards	of	 acceptance	 in	philosophy	 should	not	be	 so	high.	Thus,	
for	 example,	 Sosa	writes	 that	 philosophy,	 art	 criticism,	 politics	 and	
morality	 are	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 life	 and	 that,	 accordingly,	we	need	
to	pursue	them	with	what	good	standards	we	have,	even	if	these	are	
not	those	of	science	(2011,	p.	200).	Similarly,	Goldberg	(2013,	p.	289)	
tells	 us	 that	 in	 contexts	 where,	 as	 in	 philosophy,	 the	 standards	 of	
justification	and	knowledge	cannot	be	met	and	it	is	agreed	that	there	
is	a	need	for	information	on	certain	topics,	lower	epistemic	standards	
can	license	assertion.
The	 just-mentioned	 proposals	 according	 to	 which	 answers	 to	
substantive	 philosophical	 questions	 need	 not	 be	 reliably	 arrived	
at	 might	 provide	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	 the	 argument	 from	
disagreement,	but	it	is	one	that	makes	partisanship	about	mainstream	
philosophy	 unreasonable.	 The	 proposals	 themselves,	 note,	 do	 not	
distinguish	between	different	approaches	to	philosophy;	the	claim	is	
that	philosophy	as	such	can	proceed	with	less	than	reliable	standards.	
The	proposals	thus,	and	despite	often	being	made	by	representatives	
of	mainstream	philosophy,	do	not	bring	with	 them	arguments	as	 to	
why	we	 ought	 to	 prefer	 specific	 approaches	 to	 philosophy,	 such	 as	
those	emphasising	m-clarity	and	m-rigour.	 Indeed,	 it	would	be	hard	
to	defend	partisanship	about	mainstream	philosophy	as	a	whole	by	
appeal	to	what	is	needed,	or	valued,	from	a	human	perspective	as	such.	
As	Kitcher	points	out	(2011),	it	is	a	challenge	for	much	of	mainstream	
acceptable	way	(see,	e.g.,	van	Inwagen	2004;	Gutting	2009;	Brennan,	
2010;	Frances	2010;	Dietrich	2011;	Kamber	2011;	Sosa	2011;	Plant	2012;	
Kornblith	2013;	Lycan	2013;	Goldberg	2013;	Chalmers	2015;	Matheson	
2015;	Haack	2016).
Whether	the	argument	from	disagreement	succeeds	in	undermining	
some	set	of	standards	for	assessing	philosophical	work	might	depend,	
to	begin	with,	on	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	standards	 in	question	are	
and	have	been	employed.	If	the	standards	have	been	employed	only	
to	a	limited	extent,	then	the	existence	of	disagreement	in	philosophy	
might	be	thought	not	to	undermine	the	supposition	that	they	are	able	
appropriately	to	settle	disagreements.	Thus,	for	example,	Williamson	
(2007,	p.	286)	seems	to	suggest	that	rigour	and	clarity	are	still	largely	
absent	from	much	of	mainstream	philosophy,	even	though,	on	his	view,	
the	 best	 of	mainstream	 philosophy	 realises	 them	more	 persistently	
than	they	have	been	realised	in	the	past.	If	Williamson	is	correct,	then	
perhaps	disagreement	in	mainstream	philosophy	is	largely	a	matter	of	
the	unfulfilled	potential	of	rigour	and	clarity.	Kamber	(2011),	to	offer	
another	example,	suggests	that	it	is	experimental	philosophy	that	may	
grow	to	enable	overcoming	disagreement	in	philosophy.
A	standard	response	to	claims	that	philosophy	is	about	to	be	put	
on	a	firm	footing	is	to	point	out	their	unsuccessful	history,	a	history	
that	 appears	 to	 undermine	 similar	 claims	made	 in	 the	 present	 (see,	
e.g.,	Hacker	2009;	Brennan	2010;	Chalmers	2015).	A	further	response	
relates	 specifically	 to	 mainstream	 philosophy.	 If	 the	 claim	 that	
mainstream	philosophy	is	by	and	large	far	from	instantiating	some	set	
of	 standards	 is	 to	 block	 the	 argument	 from	disagreement,	 even	 the	
supposedly	very	best	of	mainstream	philosophy	cannot	be	supposed	
substantially	 to	meet	 the	 standards	 in	question.	For	 if	 the	very	best	
of	it	substantially	meets	these	standards,	the	ability	of	the	standards	
acceptably	to	settle	the	questions	at	hand	will	still	be	undermined.	The	
candidate	best	results	of	mainstream	philosophy	are	subject	to	much	
the	same	disagreement	as	are	other	parts	of	philosophy.	As	many	(e.g.,	
Kornblith	2010	and	Sosa	2011)	have	put	it,	disagreement	in	philosophy,	
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been	established	to	be	a	reliable	means	of	answering	substantive	phil-
osophical	questions	and	trying	nevertheless	to	legitimate	some	stan-
dards	of	acceptance	in	philosophy.	We	have	also	suggested	that,	once	
the	reliability	of	mainstream	philosophy	is	held	to	be	an	open	issue,	
there	appears	to	be	no	good	reason	to	prefer	 its	standards.	We	now	
turn	to	arguing	that	 there	are	good	reasons	to	avoid	partisanship	 in	
peer	review	in	philosophy.	Our	argument	proceeds	in	two	steps:	first,	
we	argue	that	there	are	(among	mainstream,	and	thus	among	contem-
porary,	philosophers)	no	intersubjectively	established	grounds	for	tak-
ing	 available	 philosophical	 approaches	 to	 be	 reliable	means	 for	 set-
tling	 substantive	philosophical	questions.	While	 the	argument	 from	
disagreement	supports	the	conclusion	that	there	are	no	good	reasons	
for	 thinking	that	available	approaches	are	reliable,	our	 focus	now	is	
on	the	absence	of	any	agreed	reasons	 for	 thinking	that	available	ap-
proaches	are	reliable.	We	do	not	deny	that	there	is	widespread	agree-
ment	among	mainstream	philosophers	about	how	to	do	philosophy.	
Our	point	 is	 that,	nevertheless,	mainstream	philosophers	who	have	
examined	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 reliability	 of	 philosophy	 do	 not	 provide	
agreed	grounds	for	supposing	that	any	available	approach	to	philoso-
phy	is	reliable.	Second,	we	argue	that,	 in	the	absence	of	 intersubjec-
tively	agreed	grounds	for	taking	available	approaches	to	philosophy	to	
be	reliable,	there	are	good	epistemic	and	moral	reasons	not	to	prefer	
any	particular	available	approach	to	philosophy	in	peer	review.
On	what	basis	do	we	claim	that	there	are	no	intersubjectively	es-
tablished	 grounds	 for	 taking	 available	 approaches	 to	 philosophy	 to	
suffice	reliably	to	settle	substantive	philosophical	questions?	We	base	
this	claim	on	a	reading	of	a	body	of	 literature	that	has	already	been	
extensively	 cited	 in	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 argument	 from	 disagree-
ment.	While	the	history	of	the	argument	from	disagreement	goes	back	
at	 least	 to	 the	Pyrrhonists	(Sextus	Empiricus,	 I,	 178)	and	extends	be-
yond	the	boundary	of	mainstream	philosophy	(see,	e.g.,	Vattimo	2000;	
McCumber	2013),	our	 focus	has	been	on	its	discussion	within	main-
stream	philosophy.	This	discussion	does	not	include	an	argued,	large-
ly	agreed	conclusion	that	some	philosophical	approach	or	another	is	
philosophy	 to	show	that	 it	 reflects	human	needs	and	values,	except	
perhaps	those	of	its	practitioners.
In	any	case,	the	need	for	answers	to	philosophical	questions	will	at	
best	serve	to	place	weak	constraints	on	the	standards	of	assessment	
used	in	philosophy.	That	we	need	to,	or	should,	address	philosophical,	
political,	 ethical	 and	 aesthetic	 questions	 in	 some	 context	 might	
plausibly	 be	 thought	 often	 to	 require	 a	 modicum	 of	 clarity	 and	
argumentation;	 it,	 however,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 require	 the	 peculiar	
standards	 associated	 with	 any	 specific	 approach	 to	 philosophy,	
something	that	is	made	clear	by	societally	relevant,	non-mainstream	
philosophy,	including	philosophical	literature	and	art.
Similar	considerations	apply	 to	 the	suggestion	that	m-clarity	and	
m-rigour,	 and	mainstream	philosophy	more	broadly,	 should	be	pur-
sued	 because	 they	 promote	 values	 other	 than	 truth	 and	 other	 than	
what	we	clearly	value	qua	humans,	e.g.,	 elaborate	philosophical	po-
sitions,	 the	systematic	noting	of	distinctions,	m-rigour	and	m-clarity	
themselves	and	so	on.	Thus,	one	ought	to	wonder	whether	the	argu-
mentative	apparatus	of	mainstream	philosophy	is	needed	in	order	to	
have	 its	 distinctions	 or	 its	 elaborate	 philosophical	 positions.	 More	
broadly,	non-mainstream	philosophical	approaches	promote	many	of	
the	same	valuables;	 they,	of	course,	also	promote	 their	own	alterna-
tives	to	m-rigour	and	m-clarity.	In	any	case,	promoting	what	might	be	
valuable	in	mainstream	philosophy	is	not	in	tension	with	the	pursuit	
of	non-mainstream	approaches	to	philosophy,	so	the	wish	to	pursue	
whatever	it	 is	that	mainstream	philosophy	provides	is	hardly	reason	
for	partisanship.20
Thus	far,	our	discussion	recommends	responding	to	the	argument	
from	disagreement	by	accepting	that	no	philosophical	approach	has	
20.	Rescher	(1985)	responds	to	the	argument	from	disagreement	by	distinguish-
ing	between	our	attitude	to	philosophical	claims	when	practicing	philosophy	
and	our	attitude	to	such	claims	when	reflecting	on	philosophy.	According	to	
Rescher,	 the	argument	 from	disagreement	affects	only	 the	 latter.	We	agree	
with	Plant	(2012),	however,	 that	one	cannot	separate	reflection	on	philoso-
phy	and	philosophical	practice.	Philosophical	reflection	is	applied	in	peer	re-
view,	awarding	of	funding	for	research	in	philosophy,	hiring	and	firing	and	so	
on.
	 katzav	and	vaesen Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy
philosophers’	imprint	 –		10		– vol.	17,	no.	19	(september	2017)
that	philosophical	methods	are	unreliable.	Kitcher	(2011)	writes	that	
philosophers	have	no	expertise.	And	so	on.
There	are,	to	be	sure,	arguments	for	the	claim	that	philosophy’s,	and	
in	the	recent	literature	this	usually	means	“mainstream	philosophy’s”,	
approach	is	reliable.	But	these	are	as	contested	as	any	philosophical	
thesis.	Gutting	claims	 that	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 justify	philosophy’s	
approach,	 because	 it	 proceeds	 to	 develop	 knowledge	 in	 much	 the	
same	way	as	science	does,	that	is,	via	the	use	of	deductive,	inductive	
and	abductive	inference	(2009,	p.	229).	Yet	the	literature	also	contains	
many	who	argue	that	philosophy	is	not	like	science,	including,	most	
obviously,	 those	 already	 cited	 as	 being	 sceptical	 about	 philosophy.	
Williamson	(2007)	goes	further	than	Gutting	and	offers	an	argument	
for	 optimism	 about	 philosophy.	 He	 tries	 to	 justify	 reliance	 on	 intu-
itions	about	particular	cases	in	philosophy	by	claiming	that	doing	so	is	
merely	an	instance	of	our	more	general	ability	to	reason	with	the	help	
of	counterfactuals.	This	argument,	however,	does	not	tell	us	that	there	
is	 philosophical	 knowledge	of	 answers	 to	 substantive	philosophical	
questions.	There	are	also	many	objections	to	the	argument	(see,	e.g.,	
Buckwalter	2014;	Machery	2015).
Let	us	accept,	then,	that	there	are	no	intersubjectively	established	
grounds	for	taking	any	available	approach	to	philosophy	to	be	reliable.	
Why	conclude	from	this	that	no	particular	set	of	standards,	including	
m-clarity	and	m-rigour,	should	be	preferred	in	peer	review?	Our	first	
argument	 for	doing	so	 is	based	on	epistemic	considerations.	The	re-
cent	mainstream	 literature	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 philosophical	 knowl-
edge	does	not,	as	we	have	seen,	distinguish	between	established	ap-
proaches	 to	 philosophy.	 All	 approaches	 that	 have	 been	 extensively	
tried	out	are	supposedly	equally	suspect	with	regard	to	reliability,	and	
there	 is	 supposedly	no	 agreed	epistemic	basis	 for	preferring	one	of	
these	 approaches	 over	 another.	 Some	 approaches	might	 claim	 that,	
since	they	are	relatively	new,	they	have	more	potential	for	improving	
the	 situation	 in	 philosophy	 than	do	other	 approaches;	 but	whether	
this	promise	will	be	fulfilled	remains	to	be	seen.	In	such	circumstances,	
it	would	seem	to	be	a	mistake	to	favour	any	one	approach	collectively.	
reliable.	 By	 implication,	 contemporary	 philosophy	 does	 not	 include	
such	agreement.
Gutting	 is,	 in	 comparison	 with	 most	 other	 mainstream	 philoso-
phers	who	have	recently	written	about	the	availability	of	philosophi-
cal	 knowledge,	 optimistic	 about	what	 philosophical	 knowledge	 has	
been	achieved.	He	argues	 that	we	have	a	 substantial	body	of	philo-
sophical	knowledge,	one	that	comprises	knowledge	of	philosophical	
distinctions	and	of	which	answers	to	philosophy’s	ultimate	questions	
are	currently	viable	—	that	 is,	 can	be	defended	and	elaborated	upon	
in	philosophical	discussion	(Gutting	2009	&	2013,	p.	135).	This	might	
suggest	 that,	according	 to	Gutting,	philosophers	are	able	 reliably	 to	
settle	some	philosophical	questions.	But	Gutting’s	two	sorts	of	philo-
sophical	knowledge	do	not	include	knowledge	of	answers	to	what	we	
have	 called	 substantive	philosophical	 questions.	Other	 relative	opti-
mists	about	philosophical	knowledge	 tend	 to	hold	 similar	positions	
(see,	e.g.,	Chalmers	2015).	Hanna	(2015)	is	perhaps	particularly	opti-
mistic	and	maintains	the	existence	of	some	philosophical	knowledge	
of	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philosophical	 questions.	 So,	 although	 he	
does	not	explicitly	address	the	issue	of	the	reliability	of	philosophy,	he	
may	well	suppose	that	philosophers	are	able	reliably	to	settle	substan-
tive	philosophical	questions.
The	majority	of	those	mainstream	philosophers	who	have	recently	
addressed	the	question	of	the	existence	of	philosophical	knowledge	
are	 less	optimistic	 than	Gutting.	They	emphasise	 the	extremely	 lim-
ited	existence,	or	even	nonexistence,	of	philosophical	knowledge	and	
are	 explicit	 that	 we	 do	 not	 know	 the	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philo-
sophical	questions.	These	philosophers	do	not	think	mainstream	phi-
losophy	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 reliable	 philosophical	 approach.	 Lycan	
(2013),	 for	 example,	 responds	 to	 Gutting,	 arguing	 that	 there	 is	 not	
even	much	philosophical	knowledge	of	the	sorts	Gutting	claims	there	
are.	Haack	(2016)	tells	us	that	philosophy	is	not	a	discipline	with	ideas	
ranging	from	the	solid	through	to	the	speculative;	it	is	all	speculative.	
Matheson	 (2015)	 tells	us	 that	philosophical	 investigation	 is	unlikely	
to	bring	us	closer	to	the	truth.	Sosa	(2011)	and	Brennan	(2010)	write	
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philosophy	is,	by	and	large,	funded	by	taxes	and	is	not	usually	taken	to	
be	particularly	important	to	the	spiritual	life	of	the	countries	in	which	
it	thrives.	Finally,	the	partisanship	we	have	been	discussing	might	be	
tolerable	when	there	is	no	feasible	alternative.	As	we	will	see	in	the	
next	section,	however,	improving	the	situation	we	find	in	mainstream	
philosophy	is	feasible.
It	might,	 in	response,	be	observed	that	contemporary	philosophy	
is	diverse	and	that	some	philosophy	journals	cater	to	non-mainstream	
approaches	 to	 philosophy;	 other	 avenues	 of	 publishing	 further	 en-
hance	 diversity	 in	 the	 field.	 But	 this	merely	 tells	 us	 that	 non-main-
stream	approaches	have	some	avenues	of	development,	not	that	the	
substantial	epistemic	and	moral	biases	in	our	field	are	not	as	we	have	
described	them.	Moreover,	even	where	non-mainstream	approaches	
to	philosophy	are	favoured,	the	tendency	is	to	favour	non-mainstream	
schools	 such	 as	 phenomenology,	 post-structuralism,	 speculative	 real-
ism	and	so	on.	Our	arguments	do	not	favour	approaches	to	philosophy	
adopted	by	schools	over	more	idiosyncratic	approaches.
Another	response	might	be	that	we	are	wrong	regarding	the	need	
to	have	intersubjectively	established	grounds	for	taking	standards	for	
assessing	philosophical	claims	to	be	reliable	before	we	are	entitled	to	
assume	that	they	are	reliable.	Williamson	(2011)	claims	that	philoso-
phy	is,	from	a	sociological	perspective,	a	normal	academic	discipline	
and	that	there	accordingly	is	a	presumption	that	its	practitioners	have	
real	expertise	about	issues	in	philosophy.	Such	a	presumption	obtains,	
according	to	Williamson,	because	progress	requires	it;	 if	we	insisted	
that	all	claims	to	expertise	be	tested,	progress	would	grind	to	a	halt.	
Accordingly,	Williamson	 claims,	 it	 is	 up	 to	 critics	 of	 an	 established	
philosophical	 approach	 to	 show	 that	 it	 does	not	 lead	 to	knowledge	
rather	than	for	its	practitioners	to	show	that	it	does.	Thus,	one	might	
add,	 it	would	arguably	be	up	to	critics	of	mainstream	philosophy	to	
show	that	it	is	unreliable	when	it	comes	to	substantive	philosophical	
questions	 rather	 than	 for	 its	 practitioners	 to	 show	 that	 it	 is	 reliable.	
Without	something	like	the	argument	from	disagreement,	there	would	
be	no	problem	with	the	approach	of	mainstream	philosophy.
Given	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 available	 approaches,	 it	
makes	 sense	 to	 hedge	 one’s	 epistemic	 bets	 and	 to	 try	 out	 these	 ap-
proaches	as	well	as	novel	ones.
From	a	moral	 perspective,	 it	 seems	problematic	 to	prefer	papers	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 standards	 that	 have	 not	 been	 intersubjectively	 es-
tablished	 to	be	 reliable.	 It	 is,	 to	begin	with,	 problematic	 in	 that	 the	
standards	in	question	are	treated	as	standards	by	which	to	judge	the	
truth-conduciveness	of	work	on	substantive	philosophical	issues	and	
yet	it	is	clearly	an	open	issue	whether	they	are	appropriate	standards	
for	doing	so.	Honesty	suggests	that,	in	cases	of	collective	uncertainty	
such	as	that	of	philosophy,	the	standards	for	assessment	should	reflect	
the	various	approaches	taken	by	all	those	competing	for	the	same	aca-
demic	resources.
In	 addition,	we	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 non-epistemic	 role	 of	 peer	
review.	As	mentioned	in	Section	3,	peer-reviewed	papers	are	widely	
used	to	decide	how	to	allocate	valuable,	public	resources	(e.g.,	grants,	
academic	positions,	etc.).	Consequently,	standards	for	assessing	philo-
sophical	articles	indirectly	regulate	the	distribution	of	such	resources.	
The	standards	will,	accordingly,	be	unproblematic	only	insofar	as	they	
reflect	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 proprietors	 of	 the	 resources	 in	 question.	 In	
particular,	standards	that	 lead	to	a	partisan	distribution	of	resources	
among	researchers	might	be	unproblematic	only	if	the	proprietors	of	
the	resources	in	question	have	deemed	it	acceptable	that	the	resourc-
es	be	distributed	in	a	partisan	way.	The	sources	of	funding	in	philoso-
phy,	e.g.,	government	funding	or	tuition	fees,	do	not	typically	provide	
approval	for	the	partisan	allocation	of	their	resources.	
Worse,	it	is	only	in	special	circumstances	that	partisanship	on	the	
basis	of	something	like	views	might	reasonably	be	tolerated,	even	if	
with	reservations.	Most	obviously,	such	partisanship	might	sometimes	
be	tolerable	when	it	is	not	funded	by	taxes	and	is	sufficiently	limited	
in	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 society	 in	which	 it	 occurs;	 it	might	 also	be	 tol-
erable	when	 the	partisanship	 is	 that	of	an	 institution	 that	 is	particu-
larly	important	to	the	cultural	or	religious	life	of	the	countries	where	
it	is	located	and	is	to	some	extent	compensated	for.	But	mainstream	
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philosophy;	they	leave	untouched	the	question	whether	philosophy	is	
of	value	for	reasons	other	than	its	reliability.	We	have,	accordingly,	not	
provided	an	argument	for	thinking	that	philosophy,	in	general	or	even	
in	it	is	current	academic	form,	is	not	of	value	and	thus	do	not	now	have	
to	address	such	a	worry.	Even	were	it	to	turn	out	that	mainstream	aca-
demic	philosophy	is	not	of	sufficient	value	to	justify	its	current	place	in	
academia,	this	would	be	tangential	to	our	claims	here.	The	problems	
we	have	identified	with	it	in	its	current	form,	as	well	as	our	proposals	
for	its	modification,	stand	irrespective	of	whether	further,	more	radical	
changes	are	needed.
On	a	final	note,	one	may	wonder	why	our	arguments	should	be	ac-
cepted	if	they	require	accepting	that	available	philosophical	approach-
es,	including	whatever	ours	amounts	to,	are	not	established	to	be	reli-
able.	To	begin	with,	note	that	we	have	been	examining	an	issue	that	
needs	to	be	decided	in	practice,	namely	that	of	how	to	manage	pub-
lishing	in	philosophy.	We	have	acknowledged	that	lower	standards	of	
assertion	may	well	be	acceptable	in	such	contexts.	This	acknowledged,	
the	question	is	whether	the	standards	that	we	have	met	in	this	paper	
suffice	in	order	to	contribute,	by	means	other	than	guaranteed-to-be-
reliable	output,	to	addressing	the	issue	of	how	to	manage	peer	review	
in	philosophy.	In	response,	note	that	we	have	aimed	to	provide	a	pa-
per	 that	 addresses	 the	 relevant	 literature	 in	mainstream	philosophy	
and	that	goes	substantially	beyond	that	literature,	and	we	have	aimed	
to	do	so	with	enough	m-clarity	and	m-rigour	so	as	to	encourage	fur-
ther	discussion	of	the	issues	we	have	raised.
A	second	response	concerning	the	unproven	reliability	of	our	ap-
proach	is	Pyrrhonist	in	nature.	Pyrrhonist	scepticism	can	plausibly	be	
thought	of	as	aiming	to	undermine	the	positions	of	its	opponents	not	
by	accepting	certain	arguments	against	the	opponents’	positions,	but	
by	dialectically	leading	the	opponents	to	the	conclusion	that	their	po-
sitions	are	self-refuting	(Castagnoli	2010).	Similarly,	we	have	aimed	to	
use	the	existing	literature	about	disagreement	in	mainstream	philoso-
phy,	along	with	substantial	concessions	to	the	demands	of	m-clarity	
and	m-rigour,	in	order	to	challenge	the	commitment	to	m-rigour	and	
To	begin	with,	however,	the	above	argument	fails	to	establish	that	
there	is	a	general	presumption	that	normal	academic	disciplines	are	
reliable.	For	we	do	not	have	 to	choose	between	presuming	 that	dis-
ciplines	are	reliable	and	showing	that	they	are	reliable.	It	is	possible,	
for	example,	simply	to	let	academic	philosophers	proceed	in	the	hope	
that	philosophy	might	progress	on	substantive	issues.	One	might	also	
allow	academic	philosophers	to	proceed	because	what	they	do	 is	of	
value	irrespective	of	whether	they	might	make	progress.	Further,	even	
if	 there	 is	a	general	presumption	 regarding	 the	 reliability	of	normal	
academic	 disciplines,	 the	 argument	 from	 disagreement	 does	 under-
mine	 this	 presumption	 in	 the	 case	 of	 mainstream	 philosophy.	 The	
argument	 suggests	 that	 there	 should	 be	 no	 presumption	 favouring	
the	reliability	of	any	approach	to	philosophy.	In	any	case,	there	is	no	
general	presumption	regarding	the	reliability	of	normal	academic	dis-
ciplines.	Since	resources	spent	on	research	need	to	be	justified	in	gen-
eral,	and	with	respect	to	their	distribution	among	academic	disciplines,	
research	in	a	discipline	cannot	simply	be	presumed	to	be	reliable.	So	
too,	the	approaches	employed	by	academic	disciplines,	including	that	
of	mainstream	philosophy,	are	potential	sources	of	harm;	for	example,	
mainstream	 philosophy’s	 role	 in	 education,	 including	 in	 ethics	 and	
logic	 classes,	 is	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 harm.	This	means	 that	 the	 ap-
proaches	 of	 academic	 disciplines	 cannot	 simply	 be	 presumed	 to	 be	
reliable.
The	 absence	 of	 established-to-be-reliable	 approaches	 in	 philoso-
phy,	 along	with	 the	observation	 that	 academic	philosophy	needs	 to	
justify	 its	place	 in	 the	world,	might	give	 rise	 to	despondency	about	
philosophy.	Why,	it	might	be	asked,	should	one	do	philosophy	at	all,	
never	mind	do,	and	fund,	academic	philosophy?	With	regard	to	philos-
ophy	in	general,	we	have	already	noted	that	it	is	practically	unavoid-
able	as	well	as	that	it	is	of	value,	and	one	can	make	a	case	for	its	value	
by,	for	example,	building	on	philosophy’s	historical	role	in	shaping	so-
cieties,	cultures,	the	sciences	and	individual	lives,	and	by	bringing	out	
its	aesthetic	and	other	non-epistemic	virtues.	However,	the	arguments	
that	we	have	developed	concern	only	the	reliability	of	approaches	to	
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arguments	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 all	 work	 be	 judged	 equal	 with	
regard	to	its	novelty	and	significance.	Indeed,	plausibly,	novelty	and	
significance	 can	 often	 be	 reasonably	 estimated;	 the	 significance	 of	
philosophical	work	can	sometimes	be	estimated	because	 it	 includes	
societal	importance	and	societal	impact	as	well	as	aesthetic	and	other	
non-epistemic	virtues.	Thus,	overall,	our	desiderata	do	not	mean	that	
anything	goes	in	deciding	what	to	publish	in	philosophy.	For	example,	
it	is	clear	that	student-level	work,	as	well	as	work	that	consists	solely	
in	affirmations	based	on	scripture,	is	very	unlikely	to	meet	our	second	
desideratum;	 such	work	 is	 unlikely	 to	 contribute	 anything	novel	 or	
significant	 to	our	discussion	of	 philosophical	 questions.	 In	 addition,	
philosophy	that	aims	to	be	relevant	to	some	practice	or	another	will	be	
constrained	by	the	standards	of	that	practice.	Insofar	as	it	is	to	inform	a	
practice,	philosophy	will	have	to	make	use	of	the	standards	for	clarity	
and	 rigour	 of	 that	 practice,	 including	 of	 the	 practice’s	 requirements	
regarding	empirical	evidence.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 our	 epistemic	 and	 moral	 case	 for	 pluralism	
means	that	acknowledging	significance	as	a	constraint	on	evaluating	
philosophical	 work	 should	 not	 justify	 an	 appeal	 by	 philosophers	
to	 significance	 in	 order	 to	 set	 up	 any	 kind	 of	 new,	 highly	 selective	
criteria	for	publication	instead	of	m-clarity	and	m-rigour.	Indeed,	our	
desiderata	 call	 for	 far	more	philosophical	 freedom	 than	 is	 currently	
common	in	prominent	journals.	We,	for	example,	see	no	in-principle	
epistemic	 problem	with	 an	 approach	 to	 philosophy	 that,	 following	
Pyrrhonism,	allows	weak	arguments	a	 legitimate	place	 in	 reasoning	
(Sextus	 Empiricus,	 III	 280–281).	 So	 too,	 we	 allow	 approaches	 to	
philosophy	which,	 like	Neoplatonism	and	other	 forms	of	mysticism,	
leave	open	or	 reject	 the	possibility	 that	 philosophical	 knowledge	 is	
articulable	in	clear	or	literal	language.	Appeals	to	the	truth	of	scripture	
will	 be	 acceptable	 when	 they	 are	 part	 of	 work	 that,	 as	 a	 whole,	
contributes	to	philosophical	thought,	e.g.,	that	is	novel	and	societally	
relevant.	 And,	 since	 not	 only	 available	 approaches	 will	 count	 as	
acceptable,	there	will	be	room	for	non-academic	philosophers,	as	well	
m-clarity	 in	 peer	 review.	 If	 one	 is	 committed	 to	 the	mainstream	ap-
proach,	then	one’s	own	approach	suggests	that	the	claims	of	this	paper	
should	be	engaged	with.
5. Restructuring or Replacing Peer Review
Two	desiderata	for	adequate	review	processes	in	philosophy	journals	
are	 suggested	by	 the	previous	 section.	The	first	desideratum	 is	 that	
these	processes	should	treat	all	available	and	proposed	standards	of	
acceptance	in	philosophy	as	epistemically	equal	(irrespective	of	who	
puts	 them	 forward).	 This	 desideratum	 is	 suggested	 by	 the	 thought	
that	 pluralism	 about	 philosophical	 approaches	 makes	 sense	 given	
the	lack	of	an	established-to-be-reliable	philosophical	approach.	The	
second	 desideratum	 is	 that	 review	 of	 philosophical	 work	 should	
include	evaluating	such	work	in	light	of	the	novelty	and	significance	
of	 its	 contribution	 to	 addressing	 philosophical	 questions	 that	 we	
need	to	address	as	humans,	and	indeed,	more	broadly,	in	light	of	its	
contribution	 to	 developing	 thought	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 of	 value.	 This	
desideratum	is	suggested	by	the	observation	that,	plausibly,	addressing	
questions	that	we	need	to	address	and	developing	thought	constitute	
an	important	part	of	what	is	of	societal	value	in	philosophy	apart	from	
its	potential	ability	to	answer	substantive	philosophical	questions	in	a	
reliable	way.
Both	 of	 our	 desiderata	 clearly	 recommend	 that	 approaches	 to	
philosophy	according	to	which	it	has	something	other	than	the	correct	
answers	to	its	questions	as	a	goal	—	e.g.,	literary	value,	suspension	of	
belief,	a	purely	heuristic	role	in	discovery	—	should	be	included	among	
the	repertoire	of	approaches	to	philosophy.	The	second	desideratum	
also	 recommends	 pluralism	 in	 approaches	 to	 philosophy,	 as	 the	
historical	record	shows	that	a	wide	variety	of	philosophical	approaches,	
including	the	proposal	of	novel	approaches,	have	been	of	value.
We	 emphasise	 that,	 while	 our	 arguments	 recommend	 taking	
different	 standards	 of	 acceptance	 in	 philosophy	 to	 be	 epistemically	
equal,	 these	 arguments	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 all	 philosophical	 work	
be	 treated	 as	 being	 equal	 in	 the	 review	 process.	 In	 particular,	 our	
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the	goal	of	placing	papers	in	prominent	journals	might	still	be	strong,	
some	journals	might	have	to	publish	 far	more	 in	each	 journal	 issue.	
Higher	volume	could	be	handled	financially	and	practically	by	moving	
to	online-only	publishing.	Editorial	policies	would,	of	course,	have	to	
change	in	line	with	the	higher	acceptance	rates,	e.g.,	editors	would	be	
more	inclined	to	accept	papers	where	reviewers	disagree.	
Additionally	—	also	easy	to	implement	—	journals	might	disclose,	at	
the	time	of	article	publication,	relevant	review	reports	(with	optional	
blinding	of	reviewer	names),	author	responses	and	editorial	decisions.	
Aside	from	likely	improving	the	quality	of	refereeing,	these	measures	
would	at	least	partly	accommodate	worries	of	partisanship	regarding	
approach	as	well	as	provide	an	important	opportunity	for	discussion	
of	approaches	to	philosophy.	In	order	to	make	progress	on	questions	
related	to,	for	example,	m-clarity	—	when	it	is	instantiated,	whether	it	is	
truth-conducive,	etc.	—	it	would	be	advisable	to	have	a	broad	audience	
engaging	with	particular	cases	in	which	m-clarity	judgments	are	made;	
and	it	is	precisely	these	sorts	of	judgments	that	will	hopefully	be	part	
of	the	correspondence	between	editors,	reviewers	and	authors	when	
disagreement	about	the	basics	is	substantial.
One	might	worry	that	a	higher	acceptance	rate	would	mean	lower	
standards	of	m-rigour	and	m-clarity	in	“top”	journals.	However,	while	
it	may	mean	that	more	published	papers	will	fail	to	meet	the	current	
standards	of	these	journals,	it	need	not	impact	the	work	of	those	who	
are	dedicated	to	m-rigour	and	m-clarity.	Further,	the	improved	review	
process	should	 in	 fact	be	expected	 to	 result	 in	stricter	adherence	 to	
whatever	standards	are	being	applied	in	review.	In	any	case,	given	that	
the	main	selling	point	of	m-clarity	and	m-rigour	has	been	their	truth-
conduciveness,	 and	 given	 that	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 they	 are	 truth-
conducive	 in	 the	 context	 of	 philosophy,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 reduced	
emphasis	on	these	would	be	problematic.
One	might	 also	worry	 that	 implementing	 the	 above	 suggestions	
would	 lead	to	higher	 total	publication	numbers	 in	philosophy,	 to	 in-
formation	overload	for	readers	and	to	reviewers	who	are	(even	more)	
overworked.	 But	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 those	 submitting	 articles	 also	
as	academic	philosophers	who	are	in	a	minority,	to	put	forward	their	
own	proposals	about	how	to	do	philosophy.
The	question	that	remains	for	us	in	this	section	is	what,	if	anything,	
the	 two	desiderata	 just	 outlined,	 and	 the	underlying	motivation	 for	
these	 desiderata,	 suggest	 about	 how	 peer	 review	 in	 philosophy	
journals	 should	change.	After	all,	one	might	acknowledge	 that	peer	
review	as	currently	practiced	in	mainstream	philosophy	fails	to	meet	
our	desiderata	while	 insisting	 that	doing	better	 in	 this	 regard	 is	not	
feasible.	 We	 now	 argue	 that	 this	 response	 is	 untenable	 and	 do	 so	
by	proposing,	 in	a	programmatic	manner,	ways	of	 improving	on	the	
present	situation,	including	some	that	are	relatively	easy	to	implement.
With	 regard	 to	 fostering	 pluralism	 of	 approaches	 in	 philosophy,	
the	easiest	option	 is	 for	 journals	 to	 adopt	 editorial	policies	 that	 are	
pluralist	 about	 approaches	 to	 philosophy	 and,	 correspondingly,	 for	
them	to	diversify	their	editorial	boards	and	review	committees	so	that	
each	paper	is	assessed	by	standards	that	match	its	approach.	Mind has, 
very	recently,	partly	gone	down	this	route.	But	while	this	route	is	an	
improvement	 on	 the	 current	 situation,	 it	will,	 plausibly,	 not	 do	 full	
justice	to	the	diversity	of	existing	and	potential	approaches.	If	decisions	
about	how	standards	fit	articles’	approaches	are	made	in-house,	that	
is,	among	only	a	selected	group	of	individuals,	there	seems	plenty	of	
room	for	partisanship	to	undermine	the	pluralism	of	approaches	we	
are	proposing.	 For	 such	a	 small	 sample	will	be	unlikely	 to	properly	
represent	 all	 available	 approaches.	 The	 review	 process	 itself	 faces	
similar	problems.	The	restricted	group	that	selects	reviewers	can	be	
assumed	 to	 under-represent	 existing	 diversity;	 and	 the	 same	 holds	
for	 teams	of	reviewers,	which	usually	consist	of	no	more	than	three	
individuals.
A	 further	 change	 that	 retains	 the	basic	 setup	of	 the	 current	peer	
review	system	would	be	to	lower	the	bar	for	acceptance.	Journals	could	
set	rejection	rates	at,	say,	around	60%	rather	than	at	above	90%	(as	
currently	 is	 the	case	—	see	 footnote	 1).	Lower	mainstream	standards	
of	acceptance	should	make	it	easier	for	work	to	meet	those	standards	
while	also	fulfilling	non-mainstream	standards.	At	least	initially,	when	
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no	longer	very	important.	There	are,	however,	alternative	ways	of	cer-
tification.	Authors	 should	get	 credited	 for	 their	 contributions	 to	 the	
philosophical	discussion.	An	author	may	earn	a	reputation	in	virtue	of	
the	readership	they	reach	(e.g.,	number	and	diversity	of	readers	and	of	
followers),	in	virtue	of	the	amount	of	discussion	their	work	provokes	
(e.g.,	number	of	substantive	commentaries	received,	number	of	new	
papers	it	gives	rise	too)	and	in	virtue	of	the	content	of	the	discussion	
of	their	work	(e.g.,	successful	objections	handled,	novel	positions	de-
veloped,	high	standards	set	and	met).
Plausibly,	 raising	 acceptance	 rates	 and	 changing	 editorial	 policy	
still	cannot	do	full	justice	to	the	diversity	of	existing	and	potential	ap-
proaches.	Moreover,	 plausibly,	 coming	 closer	 to	 doing	 so	would	 re-
quire	more	 inclusive	 policies	 regarding	who	 participates	 in	 peer	 re-
view,	or	even	the	elimination	of	peer	review.	A	feasible	way	of	broad-
ening	 the	participation	 in	peer	review	involves	 following	 the	public	
reviewing	 practice	 of	 most	 of	 the	 journals	 issued	 by	 the	 European	
Geoscience	Union	(EGU),	including,	e.g.,	Earth System Dynamics	and	
Climate of the Past.	Any	paper	which	passes	a	basic	quality	check	is	put	
online	 and	made	 available	 for	 public	 review	 and	 discussion.	Desig-
nated	reviewers	and	all	interested	parties	may	provide	comments,	and	
authors	get	the	opportunity	to	respond.	Based	on	the	open	discussion,	
the	editor	 takes	a	decision	on	whether	 the	piece	 is	 to	be	published	
as	is,	needs	revision	or	is	to	be	rejected.	Going	beyond	EGU	practice,	
one	could	add	that	papers	may	be	assessed	not	only	against	approach-
appropriate	standards	set	by	the	journal	but	also	by	author-selected	
standards.	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	extra	burden	of	commenting	is	
taken	up	 and	 rewarded,	 certification	 criteria	 should	 be	 extended	 to	
include	criteria	that	take	into	account	the	care	and	effort	spent	on	re-
viewing	(e.g.,	credits	from	authors,	number	and	variety	of	substantive	
comments	made).
Blinding	of	authors’	names	is	not	part	of	the	process	at	EGU	and	
does	 seem	 to	 be	 redundant	 in	 the	 review	 process	 we	 have	 been	
review	articles,	that	each	article	requires	two	reviewers	and	that	each	
philosopher	makes	five	submissions	a	year	to	journals,	each	philoso-
pher	will	have	to	review	only	ten	journal	articles	a	year.	As	for	infor-
mation	overload,	scientists	do	not	appear	to	engage	any	less	with	work	
published	in	high-profile	journals	with	high	acceptance	rates	and	total	
publication	rates,	such	as	Physical Review	and	PLoS ONE.21	Conferences,	
professional	networks,	email	alerts,	 the	ability	to	follow	the	work	of	
particular	individuals,	blogs	and	so	on	seem	to	be	sufficient	to	guaran-
tee	that	messages	of	particular	significance	come	across.	There	is	no	
reason	to	suppose	that	it	would	turn	out	to	be	otherwise	in	philosophy.	
Further,	 it	 is	not	 clear	 that	 lower	 rejection	 rates	would	 substantially	
increase	total	publication	numbers.	For	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	the	
increase	in	publication	numbers	in	currently	hard-to-get-into	venues	
would	go	along	with	an	increase	in	total	publication	numbers;	the	in-
crease	in	publications	in	previously	hard-to-get-into	venues	will,	after	
all,	 arise	 partly	 because	 papers	 they	 publish	would	 have	 otherwise	
been	published	elsewhere.	More	importantly,	if	philosophers	are	rea-
sonably	confident	 that	 they	will	be	able	 to	publish	 their	work,	 they	
may	opt	to	improve	the	significance	of	their	work	rather	than,	or	even	
at	the	expense	of,	paper	quantity.	Indeed,	a	context	in	which	publica-
tions	are	much	easier	to	come	by	than	they	currently	are	is	likely	to	cre-
ate	strong	incentives	to	change	the	institutional	setup	that	academic	
philosophers	work	in	—	including	the	way	in	which	they	are	certified	
as	academics	—	so	that	they	are	required	to	distinguish	themselves	by	
means	other	 than	publication	numbers.	Academic	philosophers	will	
thus	have	strong	 incentives	 to	do	something	other	 than	spend	their	
time	trying	to	increase	their	paper	count.
There	remains,	finally,	the	issue	of	how	academic	philosophers	are	
to	be	certified	if	publication	is	relatively	easy	and	publication	venue	
21.	 In	the	period	1948–1956,	Physical	Review,	then	the	most	prominent	journal	
in	physics,	had	acceptance	rates	of	80%	for	single-author	papers,	and	of	over	
95%	for	multi-author	papers	(Zuckerman	and	Merton,	1971).	Over	that	period,	
Physical	Review	published	a	total	of	11,609	papers	(minimally).	In	2014,	PLoS	
ONE	had	an	impact	factor	of	3.234,	despite	its	publishing	30,040	papers	in	
total,	with	an	acceptance	rate	of	nearly	70%.
	 katzav	and	vaesen Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy
philosophers’	imprint	 –		16		– vol.	17,	no.	19	(september	2017)
their	application	gives	rise	to	tensions.	A	point	to	keep	in	mind	is	that,	
as	we	have	noted,	the	appeal	to	what	is	of	value	in	thought	should	not	
be	used	by	philosophers	to	set	up	highly	selective	criteria	for	deciding	
what	is	to	be	published.	Such	appeals	should,	accordingly,	be	made	in	
a	manner	that	is	consistent	with	the	implementation	of	diverse	edito-
rial	boards,	low	rejection	rates	and	so	on.	This	means	that,	if	authors	
are	given	 the	 right	 to	decide	whether	 their	work	 is	 to	be	published,	
the	criterion	of	philosophical	significance	will	only	have	an	impact	via	
peer	review.
We	acknowledge	that	changes	that	to	some	extent	realise	our	sug-
gestions	can,	at	most,	be	a	first	step	in	changing	our	discipline	so	that	
it	more	honestly	represents	philosophy’s	special	requirements.	Main-
stream	philosophy	would	remain	much	as	it	is,	merely	by	virtue	of	its	
current	dominance,	even	were	all	of	our	suggestions	put	in	place.	Still,	
there	 is	 also	 reason	 for	optimism.	First,	 scholars	would	be	acknowl-
edged	not	only	for	their	ability	to	engage	others	in	discussion,	but	also	
for	their	participation	in	discussing	the	work	of	others.	At	least	in	this	
regard,	different	approaches	to	philosophy	are	on	a	par.	Second,	main-
stream	philosophy	might	need	to	put	more	effort	into	addressing	the	
wider	significance	of	scholars’	work.	Yet,	 increased	sensitivity	to	the	
issue	of	societal	relevance	plausibly	also	helps	in	promoting	work	to	
people	deciding	on	the	allocation	of	resources	(university	administra-
tors,	funding	agencies).	
To	 summarize,	we	 doubt	 that	 the	 current	 peer	 review	 system	 is	
the	best	of	the	worst.	Some	of	the	adjustments	discussed	above,	such	
as	increasing	acceptance	rates	and	making	the	review	process	public	
and/or	open,	are	implementable	and	would	bring	us	closer	to	satisfy-
ing	the	desiderata	we	started	this	section	with	(i.e.	pluralism	and	rele-
vance).	In	light	of	available	online	resources,	our	democratic	proposal	
doesn’t	seem	to	pose	substantial	technical	problems	either.23	Here	the	
main	challenge	might	be	changing	 the	deeply	 ingrained	habit	of	as-
sessing	scholars	by	the	prestige	of	the	journals	they	publish	in	or	by	
23.		See,	for	example,	the	resources	at	http://www.peerevaluation.org.
describing.22	Raising	journal	acceptance	rates	and	diversifying	review	
teams	already	helps	to	reduce	the	need	for	such	blinding;	these	two	
steps	presumably	reduce	biases	relating	to	who	authors	are,	e.g.,	those	
relating	to	their	gender	or	seniority,	by	allowing	much	wider	access	
to	 journals	and	broadening	 the	group	of	people	 from	which	 review	
teams	are	drawn.	Making	the	peer	review	process	public	adds	a	further	
layer	of	 critical	 scrutiny,	one	 that	makes	bias	 easier	 to	uncover	 and	
address.	Optional	blinding	of	reviewers	is	part	of	the	review	process	
at	EGU	and	does	still	seem	to	be	important	insofar	as	some	reviewers	
will	need	protection	from	some	more	influential	reviewees.
There	is	an	obvious	way	in	which	we	can	further	improve	the	ex-
tent	to	which	review	is	pluralistic.	For	we	have	still	left	review	primar-
ily	 in	 the	hands	 of	 editors	 and	 relatively	 small	 groups	 of	 reviewers.	
And	editors	might	still	be	partisan	in	their	final	decisions,	and	papers	
would	 probably	 still	 be	 assessed	 by	 relatively	 homogeneous,	 likely	
partisan	subsets	of	the	entire	professional	community,	the	latter	due	to	
the	fact	that	neither	authors	nor	reviewers	are	incentivised	to	engage	
with	scholars	and	work	outside	their	approach.	This	could	be	avoided	
by	allowing	authors	to	curate	their	own	papers.	Authors,	rather	than	
editors,	would	thus	decide	whether	and	how	to	revise	in	light	of	com-
ments	received,	when	to	consider	their	papers	to	be	final	or	to	retract.	
Moreover,	authors	would	record	their	decisions	and	the	subsequent	
reception	of	their	work	in	a	public	way,	alongside	their	published	work.
Thus	 far	we	have	considered	how	to	 foster	 the	kind	of	pluralism	
recommended	by	our	first	and	second	desiderata.	The	second	desid-
eratum	 can	 be	 further	 fulfilled	 by	 including,	 among	 the	 criteria	 for	
certification,	criteria	regarding	the	extent	to	which	philosophical	work	
instantiates	what	 is	of	value	 in	 thought	 (beyond	 the	direct	contribu-
tion	to	the	search	for	 truth).	An	important	 issue	that	would	need	to	
be	addressed	is	which,	if	any,	of	our	two	desiderata	gets	priority	when	
22.	 This	redundancy	does	not	arise	because	philosophical	approaches	might	be	
unreliable	 means	 of	 providing	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philosophical	 ques-
tions.	After	all,	blinding	might	still	be	needed	in	order	to	safeguard	the	objec-
tive	application	of	review	process	desiderata	such	as	ours.
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how	convincing	we	find	them	by	our	own	standards,	rather	than,	as	
we	propose,	by	their	contributions	to	ongoing	discussion.
6. Conclusion
Peer	review	in	philosophy	has	been,	and	still	is,	subject	to	partisanship	
that	is	hard	to	justify	on	epistemic,	moral	and,	as	we	have	argued	in	the	
previous	section,	pragmatic	grounds.	Thus,	altogether,	there	seems	to	
be	no	compelling	reason	for	keeping	current	review	practice	as	it	is.
Pluralism	 about	 philosophical	 approaches,	 partly	 recommended	
in	 light	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 established-to-be-reliable	 approach	 in	 phi-
losophy,	and	 increased	attention	 to	what	 is	needed,	or	valued,	 from	
a	 broad	 non-epistemic	 perspective,	 partly	 recommended	 in	 light	 of	
philosophers’	dependence	on	funds	provided	by	others,	might	require	
additional	sorts	of	reform.	These	aims	may	for	instance	be	fostered	by	
training	philosophers	who	have	at	least	a	basic	competence	in	multiple	
approaches	to	philosophy	and	who	place	more	importance	on	what	is	
of	societal	value	in	philosophy.	Further,	tenure,	hiring	and	grant	com-
mittees	may	need	to	better	reflect	existing	diversity.	In	sum,	we	hope	
that	our	study	will	provoke	discussion	of	issues	well	beyond	the	way	
in	which	scholarly	publishing	in	philosophy	is	currently	organized.24
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